The God of the Decree, the God of the Word (series)

Part 2: Three Cases, Tested

Where We Left Off

Part 1 built the foundation. God’s goodness is not a matter of decree but of nature, necessary rather than chosen, expressed rather than manufactured. That answers the metaphysical half of Ellis’ sentence. It does not yet answer the half built to produce a shudder: “even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent.” Knowing that God cannot decree cruelty and call it good does not, by itself, tell us what to do with the specific cases her argument could be applied to: a tree forbidden for no apparent reason, a conquest ordered against whole nations, a suffering that reaches children who did nothing to deserve it.

This part takes up those cases directly, one at a time. Before getting to any of them, there is a question sitting underneath all three, and it needs to be asked first: when something looks wrong to us, what exactly is that appearance worth?

Appears to Whom?

For the sake of convenience, let me recall the particular sentence which prompted this series of articles. And, to be sure, my intention is not to isolate Jenna Ellis, but to indicate that her argument is rather common, so common that this series of articles serves as a means of addressing the many arguments out there, in hopes of producing better future conversations rather than reducing the arguments to easily refuted strawmen.

Ellis stated the following:

“The Calvinist conception of God demands awe and fear primarily because His sovereign will must be fulfilled and because whatever He decrees must, by definition, be called good, even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent.”

Look again at the phrase that ends Ellis’ sentence: “even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent.” Appears to whom?

The only possible answer is: appears to us. To finite people, forming judgments from the outside, usually without the full picture, sometimes in the middle of grief or fear. Scripture never treats that kind of judgment as reliable. “Woe to those who call evil good, and good evil,” Isaiah warns (5:20), a warning about outright moral inversion, not just occasional error. “There is a way which seems right to a man,” Proverbs adds, “but its end is the way of death” (14:12). “Seems right” is flagged there as insufficient, not authoritative. And when Isaiah records God’s own answer to this exact problem, it is not gentle. “My thoughts are not your thoughts, Nor are your ways My ways… as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways” (55:8 to 9). Psalm 50:21 names the mistake directly: “You thought that I was just like you,” God says, and follows it with reproof, not reassurance: “I will reprove you and state the case in order before your eyes.” As a verdict on God, our perception carries no weight at all, and Scripture treats every attempt to use it that way the same. The exiles say outright, “The way of the Lord is not right,” and God does not weigh their complaint. He reverses it: “Is My way not right? Is it not your ways that are not right?” (Ezekiel 18:25). Paul closes the door entirely: “who are you, O man, who answers back to God?” (Romans 9:20). None of this means our pain is unreal or unseen. It means our feelings about God’s actions are never treated as evidence against Him

Job is the clearest picture of this. God never tells Job that his pain does not matter, but the rebuke, when it comes, is real and direct: “Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?” (38:2). It targets Job’s presumption to judge God’s governance, not the act of bringing his grief and hard questions before God at all. What follows is not an explanation but a sustained interrogation: “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell Me, if you have understanding” (38:4). God was not obligated to answer at all. God did condescend to Job and gave him the only legitimate answer to a creature whose view of events, taken from inside one lifetime with no sight of the whole, has decided it is sufficient to put God on trial.

Scripture does still show godly people pressing God with hard questions, and so we should make a few observations there. Abraham does exactly this in Genesis 18: “Shall not the Judge of all the earth deal justly?” (v. 25). But notice the direction of that question. Abraham is not measuring God against a private gut feeling about Sodom. He is reasoning from what he already knows to be true of God’s justice toward confidence that the specific outcome will match it. That is the opposite of “this feels wrong to me, so it must be wrong.” One approach starts with revelation and trusts it. The other starts with a feeling and puts God on trial.

Underneath all of this sits a single, plain admission: “The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things revealed belong to us” (Deuteronomy 29:29). We are reasoning, always, from the revealed half of a ledger we do not hold in full. That is not a modern evasion. It is where classical Reformed theology starts, not where it retreats to when cornered: Bavinck opens his Reformed Dogmatics with God’s incomprehensibility before he says anything else about Him, because taking that limit seriously is the precondition for saying anything true about God at all, not an excuse for saying nothing. This verse will come back before this series is finished, for a different reason. Not because our verdict on God is unreliable, which is the point here, but because Scripture itself will refuse to hand us the specific reason behind a specific evil. Same hidden half of the ledger, aimed at a different demand.

That is the posture this part will try to keep throughout: not suppressing the discomfort a hard text produces, but refusing to let that discomfort function as a verdict on its own.

Case One: The Forbidden Tree

Here is a version of the objection worth tackling before moving to harder ground. Genesis 1:31 calls the whole creation, everything in it, “very good.” Genesis 2:17 forbids one tree. If the tree was part of a creation God called good, how can he turn around and call it off limits? Does God call something good and then, by decree, make it bad?

The answer turns on a distinction Part 1 already put in place. Genesis 1:31’s “very good” is a statement about ontological goodness: the goodness of a created thing existing and functioning as designed. The tree, as a created thing, is genuinely good in this sense, and Scripture never retracts that. Genesis 2:17 is not a statement about ontological goodness, but about the moral permissibility of an action: whether eating from this particular tree is, for now, allowed. Those are two different kinds of claim, and conflating them into one is where the objection gets its apparent force.

The text itself settles this rather than leaving it to inference. Genesis 3:6, at the exact moment of the Fall, reads: “the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes.” That is Moses’ own description, not Eve’s self justifying rationalization, stated at the very moment of disobedience. The tree’s goodness as food, as something pleasant, is never withdrawn anywhere in the account. What made eating it wrong was not a change in the fruit. It was disobedience to a command that had nothing to do with the fruit’s nature.

This is the same ground Turretin’s third category from Part 1 was built to cover. Eating fruit, as a category of action, carries no moral content of its own. Nothing about fruit eating in general could ever be determined to be wrong by reason alone, unlike murder or idolatry, which carry moral weight built into the nature of rational creatures and their obligations to a good God and to one another. That is exactly what makes the fruit a fitting test of pure obedience: no independent moral reasoning could ever tell Adam “do not eat that” on its own. The only thing making it wrong was the command itself, which is precisely what a positive law is (see part one for the discussion). If the fruit had carried independent moral weight, this would not be a case of positive law at all. It would be moral law, and the prohibition would be redundant with what reason could already tell him.

So the tree was never called good and then relabeled bad. It stayed exactly as good as it was created to be. What changed was not the fruit’s goodness. It was whether eating it was, for the moment, permitted, and that changed the instant God gave the command.

Now, to be sure, this is not an argument I have necessarily heard or seen anyone make in these discussions. The intention here is to lay down some practical application of some of the concepts developed in Part 1 to better understand how Positive Law works.

Case Two: Canaan and King Eglon

This is the objection with real moral weight behind it, so I want to treat it with diligence.

Start with a definition that gets skipped too often. “Murder” has never meant any instance of a human being intentionally causing another human’s death. It means, and has always meant across the Christian tradition, the unauthorized, unlawful taking of innocent life. Defining terms matters so that later errors or equivocations on this issue cannot occur, whether or not intentional. It is why the same tradition that says “thou shalt not murder” also affirms capital punishment (Genesis 9:6, Romans 13:4) and just war without contradiction. A lawful execution of a convicted murderer and an act of murder both involve a person intentionally causing a death, yet no era of Christian ethics has called judicial execution murder. The moral category is tracking whether the killing is authorized, by rightful authority, against the guilty, not the physical act alone.

With that in place, let’s look at what the conquest narrative actually claims. First, it is framed as judgment for specific, named guilt, not an arbitrary land grab against the innocent. Genesis 15:16 says Abraham’s descendants cannot yet possess the land because “the iniquity of the Amorite is not yet complete,” tying the conquest, centuries later, to guilt that has been accumulating the whole time. Deuteronomy 9:5 removes any ambiguity: “It is not for your righteousness… that you are going to possess their land, but it is because of the wickedness of these nations that the LORD your God is driving them out before you.” Leviticus 18:24-25 names specific practices, including child sacrifice, as the grounds for the land itself being defiled and its inhabitants judged. This is framed, repeatedly, as the world’s Judge executing a specific sentence for specific, named crimes.

Second, God claims, and the whole of Scripture affirms, the unique, underived right to give and take life as the author of it. “The LORD kills and makes alive” (1 Samuel 2:6). “It is I who put to death and give life” (Deuteronomy 32:39). A human being taking another human’s life without authorization is murder precisely because no human holds that right on his own. The one who does hold it, the Giver of life itself, can rightly execute judgment directly or delegate it to an authorized human agent for a specific purpose, without that delegation becoming murder any more than a government’s lawful executioner is a murderer. That is not special pleading invented for Israel. It is the same structure behind any legitimate government’s power of the sword (Romans 13), traced back to its actual source.

Third, none of this asks anyone to call the cruelty in the execution good, and it does not require celebrating what happened. God ordaining that judgment fall on a nation is not the same claim as approving of every act of violence carried out within it, any more than a surgeon willing an incision is the same as approving of cutting people open in general. God says elsewhere, of judgment he himself decreed, that he takes “no pleasure in the death of the wicked” (Ezekiel 33:11). Willing an event to occur as an act of justice within a larger plan is not the same mental act as delighting in it.

Two objections tend to follow this point immediately, and I would like to briefly address them.

The first: does God not delight in justice? Psalm 11:7 says plainly that “the LORD is righteous, He loves righteousness,” and Jeremiah 9:24 has God naming justice and righteousness among the very things He delights in. The resolution is that “delight in justice” and “no pleasure in this death” have different objects even within the same event. What God delights in is the rightness of the act itself, that His moral order is never finally mocked and His own righteous character is vindicated rather than compromised. What He takes no pleasure in is the ruin of this particular person, considered on its own. A judge can be glad, without reservation, that the legal system holds and that guilt does not go unanswered, while still grieving the fate of the specific man he sentences. Those are not competing emotions canceling each other out. They are aimed at different things: one at the moral order holding, the other at the person who bears the consequence of breaking it. Ezekiel’s own next clause confirms the split: God takes no pleasure in the wicked’s death, “but rather that the wicked turn from his way and live” (33:11). That is a comparison between two possible outcomes, not a denial that the outcome which does occur remains just.

The second: Psalm 115:3 says God “does whatever He pleases.” If He decrees the death of the wicked, does that not mean He is pleased by it, by definition? The Hebrew word behind “pleases” in that verse, chaphets, is the same word translated “pleasure” in Ezekiel 33:11, and it carries the same range English “please” does: a volitional sense, to decide or choose or will, alongside an affective one, to delight in or enjoy. Psalm 115 is contrasting the living God’s unstoppable freedom to act with the idols described two verses later, who have mouths but cannot speak and hands but cannot feel. “Whatever He pleases, He does” is a statement about the efficacy of His will, that nothing external can prevent Him from carrying out what He determines, not a claim that He experiences delight at every specific effect of that will. Read that way, there is no contradiction. Psalm 115:3 uses chaphets to mean decides. Ezekiel 33:11 uses the same word to mean delights in. God’s will is never thwarted, and His settled disposition still prefers repentance to ruin. Both are true at once, because the word is doing different work in each verse.

One more thing I should address. This is not a standing warrant for holy war today, and it should never be read as one. It is tied to a specific act, at a specific point in redemptive history, by a specific and unrepeated command, for a specific covenant purpose. That non repeatability is part of the argument and is important to lay out with clarity.

King Eglon requires some exposition, because he raises a narrower version of the same question this whole piece is testing. Canaan was corporate judgment on a nation, carried out under an explicit command with stated grounds. Eglon is the killing of one man, accomplished by deception, at the hands of someone Scripture only calls a deliverer God raised up. If the answer that divine involvement does not, by itself, make an act good is going to hold up outside the cleanest case, it has to be tested here too. Judges 3 does not record God directly commanding the manner of his death the way Deuteronomy and Joshua record an explicit command for the conquest. What the text says is that after eighteen years of Moabite oppression, “the LORD raised up a deliverer for them, Ehud” (Judges 3:15), the same pattern used throughout Judges for God’s providential raising up of leaders to end foreign oppression. The most careful reading treats Ehud as a divinely raised national deliverer removing a hostile occupying tyrant, closer to a legitimate act within a war of liberation than to a private killing. That is a real answer, but it rests on inference from a pattern rather than an explicit command, and Judges as a whole is willing to present its deliverers as flawed instruments rather than moral examples. I would not build as much weight on Eglon as on the Canaanite conquest texts, where the command and its stated grounds are explicit.

Where This Leaves Us

Two of the three cases from Part 1’s closing line have now had a solid answer rather than a wave of the hand. The tree’s goodness was never withdrawn, only its permissibility was, for a reason with no moral content of its own. The conquest of Canaan was framed throughout as judgment for specific, accumulated, named guilt, carried out under an authority no human being holds on their own, and it was never intended as a repeatable warrant. Eglon’s case rests on thinner ground, and it has been treated that way rather than forced to carry more weight than the text will bear.

One case remains, and it is the hardest one in the whole set, because the framework that resolved Canaan does not fully transfer to it. Assyria, like the Canaanite armies, was raised up by God for judgment. But Assyria’s armies did not stop at the guilty; siege and invasion reach children who bore no part in the sins being judged. That is a different kind of problem than authorized judgment against named guilt, and it deserves to be met directly rather than folded into an answer built for an easier case. Part 3 takes it on without softening it.

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