The God of the Decree, the God of the Word

Part 1: What Reformed Theology Actually Teaches About God’s Goodness

Where This Starts

A recent post on X caught my attention, because its subject was the character of God, and that is where every real disagreement about Reformed Theology eventually lands. The post was written by Jenna Ellis, and she framed it as a contrast between “the vast difference between the God presented by Calvinism and the God revealed in Scripture.” She’s right that this is the actual fault line. I don’t think she considered her opening sentence as carefully as the subject deserves, but I appreciate that she named the real issue rather than a peripheral one.

Here is the sentence that everything else in this article responds to:

“The Calvinist conception of God demands awe and fear primarily because His sovereign will must be fulfilled and because whatever He decrees must, by definition, be called good, even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent.”

Strip away the theological vocabulary, and this sentence is asking one question, the only question that actually matters here:

Is something good because God says so, or does God say so because it’s good?

That’s the whole argument underneath every objection anyone will raise about the God Reformed Theology confesses. Get this one question right, and the “even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent” clause (the part meant to produce a shudder) loses its footing entirely. Get it wrong, and everything downstream of it, on either side of this debate, collapses into either an arbitrary tyrant or an empty word. This article is an attempt to set the foundation right and to show what changes once it is.

Two Ways to Answer the Question

Start with something Augustine noticed sixteen centuries ago, in a passage worth reading slowly:

“good is the earth, with the loftiness of its mountains… good is a house that is arranged in due proportions, and is spacious and bright… good is the mind of a friend, with the sweetness of agreement… good is a righteous man… good is discourse that sweetly teaches.”

He goes on like that for a while on purpose. Then he asks: once you strip away this good thing and that good thing, can you find “the good” underneath all of them? Not a good mind, not a good angel, not a good sky, but the thing that makes all those count as good in the first place. His point is this: you can’t call anything better than anything else unless some standard of goodness was already given to you to measure by. That standard, he argues, just is God.

That observation splits into two very different possible answers.  Almost every argument about how Reformed Theology confesses God, for it or against it, is secretly an argument about which answer is correct.

Answer one: something is good because God decrees, wills, or declares it to be so. Goodness is downstream of an act of will. If God willed differently, “good” would attach itself to whatever He willed instead.  The label follows the decree, wherever the decree goes. This is what Ellis claims we believe in her X Article.

Answer two: God’s decrees are good because they can’t help but express a nature that is already, necessarily, good. His will doesn’t manufacture goodness. It reveals a goodness that was never in question to begin with. This is what the Reformed actually confess.

Theologians call the first position voluntarism (technically, metaethical theological voluntarism, but we’ll use the shorter term). You won’t need the word to follow the argument, but it’s worth knowing, because the same error shows up on both sides of this debate.

The Tell in Ellis’ Sentence

Look again at her phrasing: “must, by definition, be called good.” That’s a voluntarist sentence. This is the basis of her “arbitrary ruler” claims later in her article. “By definition” does exactly what answer one requires: it treats goodness as a rule attached to the word “decree,” not as a description of God’s actual character. And once that’s granted, the next clause makes a strange kind of sense: “even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent.” If goodness really is just a label God’s will attaches to whatever He does, then yes, in principle, the label could land on cruelty. That would be a genuinely terrifying God. It is also not the God any confessional Reformed source has ever described.

The Same Error, From the Other Side

Here’s what makes this worth taking seriously rather than dismissing as an obvious misreading: real, self-identified Calvinists talk exactly like Ellis’ caricature. In one recent exchange, a Reformed Pastor named David Reece, responding to a critic who asked whether there’s a standard above God by which to judge His actions, answered:

“God defines good and evil. What He does is by definition good.”

Same phrase. Same error. Ellis is attacking a position; Reece is defending it — and they’ve landed on the identical formulation, because neither one is describing the historic Reformed position. To be fair, I think Pastor Reece just did not express himself correctly, but the statement still needs to be addressed honestly because it is possible that expressions like this are where Ellis’ got her caricature in the first place. In any case, both are describing pure voluntarism, from opposite ends of the argument. That symmetry matters: this isn’t “critics of Calvinism are wrong and Calvinists are right.” A great deal of popular-level Reformed rhetoric unintentionally collapses into the very same mistake its critics are attacking.

What the Confession Actually Says

Here is the Reformed answer (I’ll be coming from a Reformed Baptist confession, but it reflects similar expressions of the Westminster Confession), stated by the tradition itself rather than by either side of an argument on X. From the 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith, chapter 2:

The Lord our God is but one only living and true God; whose subsistence is in and of Himself, infinite in being and perfection; whose essence cannot be comprehended by any but Himself; a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; who is immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, every way infinite, most holy, most wise, most free, most absolute; working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and most righteous will, for His own glory; most loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him, and withal most just and terrible in His judgments, hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty.

Notice what’s happening in that single sentence: sovereignty and goodness are never separated, not even for one clause. God’s will is called “most absolute.”  But in the same breath God is said to be “immutable and most righteous.” The confession never lets sovereignty stand alone long enough to be isolated from the rest of who God is. Ellis’ opening assertion that God is demanding awe and fear “primarily” because of His sovereign will requires pulling sovereignty out of that list and setting it above the others. In other words, Ellis is saying that the Reformed believe that God acts by fiat and does whatever he wishes devoid of the other perfections in God’s nature. The confession itself won’t allow for this.

Why This Matters

Here is the deeper reason sovereignty and goodness can’t be pulled apart: in classical Reformed theology, they were never two separate things riding alongside each other in God to begin with. This is the doctrine of divine simplicity confessed in that same paragraph (“without body, parts, or passions”).  Simplicity is the teaching that God’s attributes are not components bolted onto Him. To paraphrase R.C. Sproul, sovereign isn’t something God does, on top of also being good. Sovereign is something God is.  So is goodness, and so is wisdom, and none of them exist as separable parts that could, even hypothetically, be pried apart and set against one another.

That has a direct consequence for the question this article is asking. If sovereignty and goodness were separate ingredients, you could imagine one overriding the other. You could envision a decree so sovereign it steamrolls the goodness. But if they’re not separate ingredients at all — if there is only one undivided God and “sovereign” and “good” are both simply true descriptions of that one thing then there is no mechanism by which sovereignty could ever produce something goodness forbids. There is nothing else to do the overriding.

Could God Have Been Otherwise?

A sharp reader might press here: fine, but couldn’t God’s nature simply have come out differently? Couldn’t He have been the kind of God who approves of cruelty, the way some people happen to be cruel, and others happen to be kind?

No!  And the reason is foundational and is worth some explanation. A decision is, by its nature, the kind of thing that could have gone another way; that is what makes it a decision.  A decision is something of a chance rather than an inevitability. But God’s existence isn’t a decision, and His nature isn’t a trait He happened to end up with, the way a person’s character gets shaped by circumstances that could have gone differently. There was never a “before” in which God’s character got assembled one way instead of another. Psalm 90:2 says, “…from everlasting to everlasting You are God.” There was never a time when God was something else. God did not experience change: maturity or degeneration. God has always been God, and he will never be anything but God.

So, no, he could not have been otherwise. Instead, ask if a triangle could have 4 sides. The answer is “No.” Not because there is someone deciding by fiat triangles should have three sides, and not as a word game about changing definitions. By way of illustration (with the caveat that all finite analogies break down when describing the infinite) a triangle is, by its nature, three-sided. Add another side and it is no longer a triangle.  It is some other shape entirely.

That is the category to which God’s nature belongs. It is not that “God happens to be good, things could have gone differently, and God could have chosen evil,” but “God’s goodness is what God’s nature consists of.” God is, as to his nature good in the same way a triangle is, as to its nature, three sided. “Could God’s nature have approved of idolatry?” becomes the same kind of question as, “can we have a four-sided triangle or a square circle?” The answer isn’t no, because it’s forbidden. The answer is no, because it’s incoherent.

This can sound like abstract metaphysics laid on top of Scripture. It is not. Scripture uses exactly this kind of language about God:

“God, who cannot lie” (Titus 1:2)

“He cannot deny himself” (2 Timothy 2:13)

“God cannot be tempted with evil” (James 1:13)

“Cannot” expresses impossibility. It is not the language of permission. Nobody says, “the triangle cannot have four sides” and means “the triangle has decided against it.” Scripture describes the same kind of necessity the triangle illustrates. Goodness is not a rule God has chosen to keep. These are all verses expressing things God cannot do because it contradicts his nature.

This Argument Is Nothing New

None of this is a modern challenge. Ellis did not invent this on the spot in her post on X. The Reformed tradition has been saying exactly this for hundreds of years, often against the identical charge Ellis is raising.

The Puritan theologian Stephen Charnock put the essentialist answer as plainly as it has ever been put, in his Discourse Upon the Goodness of God:

“He was good in the order of nature, before he loved himself, and his being good was the ground of his loving himself.”

Notice what that sentence rules out. It isn’t just denying that God’s decrees invent goodness.  It’s denying that even God’s own self-regard is what makes Him good. His goodness comes first, logically, before anything else about Him, including His own love for Himself. There is no version of God, at any conceptual point, where His goodness was still pending.

Francis Turretin, writing in Geneva a generation earlier, drew a distinction that heads off an objection before it’s even raised. He divided divine law into three tiers:

Divine right which is grounded in God’s own nature and therefore unchangeable

Natural or moral right which is grounded in the fixed nature of rational creatures, meaning its goodness is there before any command ever touches it

Positive right which addresses matters such as which day is set apart for rest (Sabbath) or whether a tree should be forbidden. These are good simply because commanded, with no deeper reason given.

Turretin doesn’t pretend that last category isn’t voluntarist. It is. But he is explicit that God “cannot dispense with any of the precepts of the moral law at any time, for any reason.” The one place where “good because commanded” genuinely applies is walled off, on purpose, from anything touching truthfulness, justice, or the treatment of persons made in God’s image. Charnock, in that same discourse, sharpens the point further. Even a freely given command is never free to be unrighteous: “He freely gave him a positive law, but necessarily a wise and righteous law, because he was necessarily wise and righteous before he was freely a lawgiver.” The freedom, in other words, is only in whether to legislate at all, and in which non-moral specifics to choose (this day, not that one). It is never in whether the resulting command turns out to be good.

And this fight itself that Ellis puts forth (“the God of Calvinism” against “the God of love”) is not new. Petrus van Mastricht, writing his own systematic theology in the same century as Turretin, names the exact accusation she is making, aimed at a different audience:

“We pose this question especially due to the Lutherans, who so that they may more easily justify the schism they have made… have nothing more frequently in their mouth than the opposition between God’s love for men and Calvin’s hatred for them.”

That is van Mastricht saying that the Lutherans are preoccupied with accusing the Reformed of believing in a God that hates men as opposed to their God who loves them. But this is to show that three and a half centuries before this showed up in a tweet Reformed theologians were already fielding the identical charge, in the identical terms, and answering it the same way this article has. The decree touches no one directly; in the old vocabulary, it is an immanent act, something resolved within God’s own will, not something that reaches out and injures a creature. What reaches the creature is the execution of that decree, carried out through real, willing, responsible agents, whose sin remains entirely their own. Mastricht states the distinction with a precision that stands out: God is the cause of an event’s futurition  (the eternal, settled fact that it will certainly occur).  But the event itself, in time, with all its moral content, belongs to the creature who does it. “The futurity is from God by the decree, the future thing is from the creatures: the futurity is good, the sin evil.”

This is the same claim Genesis 50:20 makes. When Joseph tells the brothers who sold him into slavery: “You meant evil against me, but God meant it for good.” One event. Two intentions. Neither one is pretending the other doesn’t exist, and neither one is asked to relabel itself to match the other.

Ellis has said elsewhere that she’s read the Reformed theologians and confessions. Fair enough, but a claim to familiarity with primary sources carries an obligation to demonstrate it, not merely assert it. And on that standard, this sentence (the one that prompted this article at the top) doesn’t hold up: Turretin explicitly denies that God’s decrees are good ‘by definition’ rather than by nature; Charnock devotes an entire discourse to refuting the very formulation this sentence assumes; Mastricht’s account of the decree draws exactly the distinction this sentence collapses. Whatever she’s read, nothing in how she states the Reformed position here shows it.

Where This Leaves Us

None of this, on its own, answers the harder half of Ellis’ sentence, the part built to produce a shudder rather than an argument: “even when it appears evil, cruel, or morally abhorrent.” Knowing that God’s goodness is necessary, not decreed, doesn’t yet explain why a forbidden tree could be good and forbidden at once, why God could ordain the Canaanite conquest without becoming a murderer, or why a good God allowed Assyria’s armies anywhere near a child. Those aren’t objections this foundation dissolves by itself.  They’re the specific cases the foundation now must be tested against, one at a time, including the ones that don’t resolve as cleanly as we might like. That’s Part 2.

The post The God of the Decree, the God of the Word appeared first on Alpha and Omega Ministries.

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